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REGULAR ARTICLE
Inner speech is used to mediate short-term memory, but not
planning, among intellectually high-functioning adults
with autism spectrum disorder
DAVID M. WILLIAMS,a DERMOT M. BOWLER,b AND CHRISTOPHER JARROLDc
aDurham University; bCity University London; and cUniversity of Bristol
Abstract
Evidence regarding the use of inner speech by individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is equivocal. To clarify this issue, the current study employed
multiple techniques and tasks used across several previous studies. In Experiment 1, participants with and without ASD showed highly similar patterns
and levels of serial recall for visually presented stimuli. Both groups were significantly affected by the phonological similarity of items to be recalled, indicating
that visual material was spontaneously recoded into a verbal form. Confirming that short-term memory is typically verbally mediated among the majority of
people with ASD, recall performance among both groups declined substantially when inner speech use was prevented by the imposition of articulatory
suppression during the presentation of stimuli. In Experiment 2, planning performance on a tower of London task was substantially detrimentally affected by
articulatory suppression among comparison participants, but not among participants with ASD. This suggests that planning is not verbally mediated in ASD.
It is important that the extent towhich articulatory suppression affected planning among participants with ASDwas uniquely associated with the degree of their
observed and self-reported communication impairments. This confirms a link between interpersonal communication with others and intrapersonal
communication with self as a means of higher order problem solving.
There is a long-standing debate in psychology and philoso-
phy about the relation between language and thought (e.g.,
Carruthers, 2002; Sokolov, 1972). Recent behavioral and
neuropsychological studies have provided convincing evi-
dence that several aspects of executive control depend to
some extent on linguistic thinking (e.g., Baldo et al., 2005;
Dunbar & Sussman, 1995; Gruber & Goschke, 2004). Ac-
cording to Vygotsky’s influential (1987) theory, the ability
to “think in speech” (as opposed to visual imagery) is critical
for flexible behavior and cognition, and is the foundation for
effective self-regulation. It is crucial that Vygotsky (1987) ar-
gued that verbal thinking has its roots in linguistically medi-
ated exchanges with others (such as caregivers) early in life.
These interpersonal dialogues, which serve as an external
means of regulating the child’s behavior early in life, gradu-
ally become intrapersonal over time, such that the child is
able to regulate their own behavior by engaging in dialogue
with self, in the absence of others. Initially, this self-talk is
overt in the form of “private speech” (previously known as
egocentric speech), which occurs almost universally among
typically developing children (Winsler, de Leon, Wallace,
Carlton, & Willson-Quayle, 2003). Then, during middle
childhood, self-talk becomes internalize d to form “inner
speech.” Vygotsky (1987) viewed the conversion of private
speech into inner speech as heralding the final shift from pre-
verbal thought to fully intrapersonal verbal thinking.
In the current study, we explored the verbal mediation of
different domains of cognition in autism spectrum disorder
(ASD), a disorder of social communication that, if the Vygots-
kian theory is correct, should involve a significant diminution
of inner speech use (see Fernyhough, 1996). We now outline
evidence regarding the typical development of verbal media-
tion before discussing existing evidence regarding verbal me-
diation among individuals with ASD.
The Typical Development of Verbal Mediation
Results from research involving typically developing children
have been largely supportive of Vygotsky’s (1987) theory
about the developmental course and functional significance
of verbal thinking (e.g., Al-Namlah, Fernyhough, & Meins,
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2006; Fernyhough & Fradley, 2005; seeWinsler, Fernyhough,
& Montero, 2009). In particular, research has focused on the
development of inner speech use for the purpose of mediating
short-term/working memory and executive functions.
In line with Vygotsky’s (1987) view that inner speech is
not fully functional until middle childhood, several lines of
evidence suggest that short-term memory is not fully verbally
mediated until around 6 or 7 years of age among typically de-
veloping children. In order to establish whether short-term
memory for visually presented information is verbally or vi-
sually mediated, studies have assessed the effect on serial
recall of manipulations to the phonological (and visual) prop-
erties of the items to be recalled. Among typically developed
adults, pictorial items with similar-sounding verbal labels
(such as “cat,” “mat,” “hat”) are recalled significantly less
well than pictures that have dissimilar sounding verbal labels
(such as “bell,” “shoe,” “drum”). This “phonological similar-
ity effect” (PSE) is clear evidence that visually presented
information has been recoded into a verbal form, such that re-
call is affected by manipulations to the phonological proper-
ties of the to be remembered pictures (see Gathercole, 1998).
A number of authors have argued that it is only from ap-
proximately 7 years of age onward that typically developing
children show a PSE for visually presented material in serial
recall, suggesting that before this age they do not sponta-
neously employ inner speech as a means of mediating short-
term memory (Halliday, Hitch, Lennon, & Pettipher, 1990;
Hayes & Schulze, 1977; Hitch, Halliday, Schaafstal, & Hef-
fernan, 1991). Rather than being negatively affected by the
phonological similarity of items to be recalled, children be-
low 7 years of age tend to recall items that have similar visual
appearances (e.g., pen, knife, tie, all presented at the same
angle of orientation) significantly less well than visually dis-
similar items. This “visual similarity effect” is seen as further
evidence that young children are restricted to representing
items visually in short-term memory (Brown, 1977; Hayes &
Shulze, 1977; Hitch, Halliday, Schaafstal, & Schraagen,
1988; Hitch, Woodin, & Baker, 1989).
An alternative way of assessing whether short-term mem-
ory (or any other aspect of cognition) is verbally mediated is
to assess the effect on serial recall of preventing the use of in-
ner speech during the presentation of stimuli. “Articulatory
suppression” involves articulating aword or phrase repeatedly,
and is thought to selectively disrupt verbal thinking (Murray,
1967), leaving visuospatial reasoning uninterrupted (e.g.,
Hyun & Luck, 2007). If an individual mediates a cognitive
task verbally, then performing the task under conditions of ar-
ticulatory suppression should detrimentally affect their perfor-
mance, whereas it should have little impact on the performance
of an individual who does not employ verbal mediation.
Several studies have shown that articulatory suppression
has a substantial detrimental effect on serial recall among
children from approximately 6 or 7 years of age, but little
or no impact on the serial recall of younger children (e.g.,
Ford & Silber, 1994; Halliday et al., 1990; Hitch & Halliday,
1983). When inner speech is blocked by articulatory suppres-
sion, older children and adults show a pattern of serial recall
that resembles the pattern observed in young children under
normal conditions. Hence, articulatory suppression mini-
mizes or eliminates the PSE in older individuals (e.g., Cowan,
Cartwright, Winterowd, & Sherk, 1987; Ford & Silber, 1994;
Hasselhorn & Grube, 2003; Hitch et al., 1991; see also Tam,
Jarrold, Baddeley, & Sabatos-DeVito, 2010), and also results
in a significant visual similarity effect (Hitch et al., 1989).
These findings complement those from studies assessing
phonological and visual similarity effects, and support the
view that short-term memory is fully verbally mediated
only from approximately 7 years of age onward.
Implicit in Vygotsky’s (1987) theory is the idea that the
shift to fully (internalized) verbal thinking at around 7 years
of age is a domain-general one, such that multiple domains
of cognition become verbally mediated at this age. This idea
has been stated explicitly by several contemporary Vygotskian
theorists (e.g., Fernyhough, 1996; Al-Namlah et al., 2006) and
has received support from studies that have shown higher or-
der executive functions, such as planning and task switching,
to be verbally mediated from this age onward. For instance,
two studies have shown that articulatory suppression disrupts
planning abilities in typically developing children and adults
(Lidstone, Meins, & Fernyhough, 2010; Wallace, Silvers,
Martin, & Kenworthy, 2009; but see PhillipsWynn, Gilhooly,
Della Sala, & Logie, 1999). In these studies, planning skills
were assessed using the classic tower of London task (Shal-
lice, 1982), which consists of three colored disks that can be
arranged on three individual pegs. The aim of the task is to
transform one arrangement of disks (the start state) into
another arrangement (the goal state) by moving the disks be-
tween the pegs, one disk at a time. To achieve this in as few
moves as possible, which is the aim of the task, requires effi-
cient planning (e.g., Owen, Downes, Sahakian, Polkey, &
Robbins, 1990). Wallace et al. (2009) found that typically de-
veloping adolescents took significantly more moves to com-
plete the tower of London task under conditions of articulatory
suppression than under silent conditions. Similarly, Lidstone
et al. (2010) found that 7- to 10-year old children completed
significantly fewer tower of London puzzles in the minimum
number of moves when completing the task under suppression
than when completing the task in silence.
Several other studies have shown that articulatory suppres-
sion negatively affects typically developing individuals’ abil-
ity to switch flexibly between different cognitive activities.
It is well established that switching from one task to another
(e.g., subtracting one number from another on one trial and
adding up two numbers on the following trial, in an alternat-
ing fashion) results in a significant increase in overall comple-
tion time, relative to undertaking the same task repeatedly
(e.g., adding numbers together on successive trials; see
Monsell & Driver, 2000). The difference in completion
time between task-switch and task-repeat trials is known as
the “switch cost.” This switch cost is significantly larger un-
der articulatory suppression than under silent conditions (e.g.,
Baddeley, Chincotta, & Adlam, 2001; Emerson & Miyake,
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2003). Thus, although articulatory suppression has only a
minimal effect on performance on task-repeat trials, it has a
substantial negative effect on performance on task-switch
trials (Miyake, Emerson, Padilla, & Ahn, 2004).
Finally, some direct evidence for the idea that the develop-
mental shift to verbal mediation is domain-general comes
from a study by Al-Namlah et al. (2006). They found that,
among a group of children with a mean age of 6 years, the
amount of task-relevant private speech used during the tower
of London task was significantly associated with the size of
the phonological similarity effect shown by these participants
in a short-term memory task. Therefore, among typically de-
veloping children, it appears that once verbal mediation is
employed for short-termmemory, it is also used for higher or-
der planning.
Verbal Mediation Among Individuals With ASD
ASD is diagnosed on the basis of a set of core impairments in
social engagement, communication, and behavioral flexibil-
ity (American Psychiatric Association, 2000; World Health
Organisation, 1992). By definition, individuals with ASD en-
gage in relatively little of the early communicative exchanges
that Vygotsky (1987) suggested were critical for the formation
of verbal thinking. From a Vygotskian perspective, then, in-
dividuals with ASD would be expected to show a diminished
tendency to employ inner speech as a primary means of think-
ing (Fernyhough, 1996, 2008). This diminution should be
apparent across multiple domains of cognition, if the shift
from nonverbal to verbal mediation is a domain-general one.
Several independent facts make plausible the suggestion
that inner speech use may be diminished in ASD, and that
this diminution may be related to the behavioral features
and cognitive deficits associated with the disorder. Firstly,
individuals with ASD sometimes report a tendency toward vi-
sual thinking (or “thinking in pictures;” Grandin, 1995), and a
relative or total absence of inner speech (Hurlburt, Happe´, &
Frith, 1994). Second, individuals with ASD often display the
kinds of limitation in self-regulation and cognitive flexibility
that are associated with diminished inner speech use in other
populations (see Hill, 2004; Kenworthy, Yerys, Anthony, &
Wallace, 2008). Russell, Jarrold, and Hood (1999) suggested
that the specific profile of executive dysfunction that they ar-
gued characterized ASD might be caused by a diminished
propensity to employ inner speech. They argued that indi-
viduals with ASD are reliably impaired only on those execu-
tive functioning tasks that require the maintenance in mind of
novel, arbitrary information/rules. Russell et al. (1999) argue
that performance on such tasks is facilitated by the use of in-
ner speech as a tool for self-reminding about which informa-
tion to follow and which information to ignore. If so, a rela-
tive lack of inner speech use by individuals with ASD
could explain the deficits in executive functioning that are fre-
quently observed among people with ASD (Hill, 2004).
Despite the strong theoretical reasons to expect a diminu-
tion of inner speech use among people with ASD (e.g., Ferny-
hough, 1996), controlled experimental studies have yielded an
inconsistent pattern of results. Recently,Williams, Happe´, and
Jarrold (2008; see also Russell, Jarrold, & Henry, 1996) found
that children with ASD showed a developmentally appropriate
pattern of verbal mediation of short-term memory (but see
Joseph, Steele, Meyer, & Tager-Flusberg, 2005). On the one
hand, children with andwithout ASDwho had a verbal mental
age of 7 years and above showed a large, statistically signifi-
cant PSE in their serial recall of visually presented informa-
tion. In contrast, children with and without ASD who had a
verbal mental age below 7 years showed no sign of a PSE,
but did show a large visual similarity effect, indicating the vi-
sual mediation of short-term memory.
Winsler, Abar, Feder, Schunn, and Rubio (2007) also
found that aspects of executive functioning appear to be ap-
propriately verbally mediated among individuals with ASD.
Winsler et al. (2007) assessed the amount and kind of private
speech used by intellectually high-functioning children with
and without ASD during tests of executive set-shifting (the
Wisconsin Card Sort task; Harris, 1990) and planning (the
building sticks task; Schunn & Reder, 1998). Contrary to
their expectations, Winsler et al. (2007) found children with
ASD were as likely as typically developing comparison chil-
dren to employ private speech during these tasks. Moreover,
this private speech was both task relevant and associated with
task performance. These findings led Winsler et al. (2007,
p. 1361) to conclude that “when directly examined, high-
functioning children with ASD do not appear to have a deficit
in the spontaneous production of relevant, potentially helpful
PS [private speech] during EF [executive functioning].”
Together, the studies by Williams et al. (2008), Winsler
et al. (2007), and Russell et al. (1996) suggest that verbal
mediation of both short-term memory and executive func-
tioning is typical in ASD. However, contrary to these find-
ings, other studies have reported that articulatory suppression
does not negatively affect the performance of individuals
with ASD on measures of executive functioning or working
memory, suggesting diminished verbal mediation (Holland
& Low, 2010; Wallace et al., 2009; Whitehouse, Maybery,
& Durkin, 2006). Nevertheless, potential concerns about
each of these latter studies might lead to caution over the in-
terpretation of their results.
Two studies have explored the verbal mediation of task
switching in ASD. In Whitehouse et al. (2006), participants
with ASD, as well as verbal age matched (but not chrono-
logical age matched) comparison participants, completed an
arithmetical task-switching task, once under silent conditions
and once under conditions of articulatory suppression.White-
house et al. (2006) report that articulatory suppression had
only aminimal effect on the switching performance of children
with ASD, but a significant negative effect on the switching
performance of comparison participants. From this, they con-
cluded that “the present finding that blocking inner speech use
has no effect on the task-switching performance of those with
autism indicates that this population does not use inner speech
to complete such tasks.” (Whitehouse et al., 2006, p. 863).
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However, upon reinspection, the results turned out to be more
complex than suggested by this conclusion.
In a reanalysis of Whitehouse et al.’s (2006) data, Lid-
stone, Fernyhough, Meins, and Whitehouse (2010) found
that 60% (n ¼ 12/20) of the ASD sample was substantially
negatively affected by articulatory suppression, indicating
that the majority of the group were employing inner speech
to mediate the experimental task. The original result reported
by Whitehouse et al. (2006), which indicated the ASD group
were less affected by articulatory suppression than the com-
parison group, had been driven by only a minority of the
ASD group whose task-switching performance was relatively
unaffected by articulatory suppression (see Williams & Jar-
rold, 2010). Moreover, Lidstone et al.’s (2010) analysis high-
lighted that children with ASD in Whitehouse et al.’s (2006)
study who were unaffected by articulatory suppression had a
mean verbal mental age of only 7 years, 9 months (7;9, SD¼
1;4). Given that children (with or without ASD) would not be
expected to employ verbal mediation until their verbal mental
age exceeded 7 years (Williams et al., 2008), it is not neces-
sarily atypical for a number of this developmentally young
subsample to have been unaffected by articulatory suppres-
sion (e.g., Ford & Silber, 1994).
As in Whitehouse et al. (2006), Holland and Low (2010)
reported that the task-switching performance of children
with ASD was not significantly negatively affected by con-
current articulatory suppression. However, the groups of par-
ticipants in Holland and Low’s study were not closely
matched for age (or, as a result, verbal IQ). Although the au-
thors report that the difference in age between the groups was
nonsignificant, our calculations suggest that the difference
was substantial (d ¼ 0.84). It is important that, within the
ASD group, chronological age was also moderately corre-
lated (r ¼ 2.37) with the main variable of interest, namely,
with the extent to which articulatory suppression negatively
affected task-switching performance. As such, differences
between the groups in chronological age could well have con-
tributed to the group difference in the use of inner speech to
mediate the experimental task. Moreover, Holland and Low
(2010) did not present data on what proportion of the ASD
group were unaffected by articulatory suppression. Therefore,
as was the case withWhitehouse et al.’s (2006) results, differ-
ences between the groups in Holland and Low’s (2010) study
could have been driven by a small minority of the ASD group.
Two studies have explored the verbal mediation of plan-
ning in ASD. InWallace et al. (2009), closely matched groups
of ASD and comparison participants completed four trials of
a standard tower of London task under silent conditions and
four different trials under articulatory suppression. Wallace
et al. (2009) reported that articulatory suppression signifi-
cantly negatively affected the planning performance of com-
parison participants (with a small effect size; d ¼ 0.47), but
did not significantly impair the performance of ASD partici-
pants (d¼ 0.21). However, the interaction between the effect
of articulatory suppression and diagnostic group was not sig-
nificant. Consequently, the extent to which the planning per-
formance of participants with ASD was negatively affected
by articulatory suppression was not reliably different from
the extent to which the planning performance of comparison
participants was negatively affected. According to our calcu-
lations, the difference between the groups in this respect was
minimal (d ¼ 0.29).
Holland and Low (2010) also gave participants with and
without ASD a Tower of Hanoi planning task under condi-
tions of articulatory suppression, as well as under silent con-
ditions. Unlike Wallace et al. (2009), Holland and Low
(2010) did find a significant interaction between diagnostic
group and condition, which reflected the fact that typically
developing comparison participants were more negatively
affected by articulatory suppression than were participants
with ASD. However, the Tower of Hanoi methodology em-
ployed by Holland and Low (2010) was somewhat question-
able. Holland and Low (2010) employed a standard Tower
task (Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001), which consists of
nine trials of increasing difficulty (i.e., an increasing mini-
mum number of moves required to complete each trial).
Yet, participants completed only a single trial of the Tower
task under each of the three conditions (silence, articulatory
suppression, spatial tapping). From the description of the
procedure provided in the paper, it appears that participants
completed the same trial in each condition (i.e., completed
the same trial on three occasions). Although the order in
which each condition was undertaken was counterbalanced
across participants, the fact that the same trial was completed
on multiple occasions provides reason to be cautious about
interpreting the processes underlying task performance.
Rationale for and Details of the Current Study
There is a clear debate about the nature of verbal mediation in
ASD. For a number of reasons, it is important that the dis-
crepancies in results between previously conducted studies are
clarified. Perhaps most notably, if inner speech is not used
by people with ASD as a primary means of thinking, inter-
vention efforts could be targeted at encouraging verbal medi-
ation with the aim of remediating aspects of the cognitive and
behavioral phenotype of ASD (Williams & Jarrold, 2010).
Such a strategy has proven useful for increasing cognitive
flexibility among young typically developing children (Asar-
now & Meichenbaum, 1979; Kray, Eber, & Karbach, 2008).
However, it is far from clear that individuals are atypical in
their use of verbal mediation. If individuals with ASD are typ-
ical in this respect, this would have significant consequences
for theories of both typical and atypical development (Ferny-
hough, 2008; Russell et al., 1999; Vygotsky, 1987).
Wallace et al. (2009) suggest that one way to clarify the
discrepancies between studies conducted to date is to employ
a combination of tasks and techniques (used across various
previous studies) among the same individuals. Therefore,
we explored the verbal mediation of both short-term memory
(Experiment 1) and executive planning (Experiment 2), as-
sessing the effects of phonological similarity and articulatory
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suppression (as measures of verbal mediation) on task perfor-
mance, among individuals with and without ASD. This al-
lowed us to evaluate whether contradictory results between
studies are due to (among other possibilities):
1. The differing domains of cognition assessed across pre-
vious studies: Perhaps individuals with ASD are atypical
in the sense that they employ inner speech for some pur-
poses (e.g., short-term memory), but not for other pur-
poses (e.g., planning or task switching). If this is the
case, individuals with ASD should show different patterns
of performance across Experiments 1 and 2. For example,
if individuals with ASD employ inner speech for the pur-
poses of short-term memory, but not planning, then they
should show a significant PSE and a significant articula-
tory suppression effect in Experiment 1, but be unaffected
by articulatory suppression in Experiment 2.
2. The relative sensitivity of different techniques to dimin-
ished inner speech use in ASD: Perhaps independent of
the domain of cognition assessed, articulatory suppression
is more sensitive to diminished inner speech use in ASD
than are other techniques, such as similarity effects. This
would explain why previous studies that have employed
articulatory suppression have reported diminished inner
speech use among people with ASD, whereas studies em-
ploying other techniques have found no evidence of such
diminution. Hence, if inner speech use is diminished in all
respects among people with ASD, but only articulatory
suppression is sensitive enough to detect this, then partic-
ipants with ASD should show a significant PSE in Experi-
ment 1, but be unaffected by articulatory suppression in
both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2.
3. Potential flaws in one or more of the studies: Perhaps in-
consistent results between previous studies have been due
to difficulties with previous study designs, rather than in-
herent differences in inner speech use between ASD and
comparison groups. If this is the case, the sample of par-
ticipants with ASD in the current study should perform
similarly across both experiments. Participants with
ASD may display entirely typical inner speech use and
show a PSE in Experiment 1 and an articulatory suppres-
sion effect in experiments 1 and 2. Alternatively, they may
show consistently diminished inner speech use and thus
fail to display a PSE in Experiment 1 or an articulatory
suppression effect in either Experiment 1 or Experiment 2.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants. Ethical approval for the study was obtained from
City University Research Ethics Committee. Seventeen adults
with ASD and 17 typically developed comparison adults took
part in Experiment 1, after they had given their written, in-
formed consent. Participants in the ASD group had received
formal diagnoses of autistic disorder or Asperger’s disorder,
according to conventional criteria (American Psychiatric As-
sociation, 2000; World Health Organization, 1992). All par-
ticipants with ASD completed the Autism-Spectrum Quotient
(AQ; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Club-
ley, 2001), a self-report measure of ASD features, and all
were administered the Autism Diagnostic Observation Sched-
ule (ADOS; Lord et al., 2000), a detailed observational assess-
ment of ASD features. All but one comparison participant
completed the AQ. Participants in the ASD group scored
above the defined cutoff for ASD on both the ADOS (total
score  7; Lord et al., 2000) and the AQ (total score  26;
Woodbury-Smith, Robinson, Wheelwright, & Baron-Cohen,
2005).1 The mean ADOS total score of the ASD group was
in the autism range. Participants in the comparison group
scored below the defined cutoff for ASD on the AQ. No par-
ticipant in either group reported any current use of psychotro-
pic medication or illegal recreational drugs, and none reported
any history of neurological or psychiatric illness, other than
ASD. Using the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scales—Third
EditionUK (WAIS;Wechsler, 2000), the groupswere equated
for verbal, nonverbal, and full-scale IQ. The groups were also
equated for chronological age. Participant characteristics are
presented in Table 1.
Apparatus and stimuli. Stimuli for the serial recall task were
18 pictures similar to those used by Hitch et al. (1989) and
Williams et al. (2008). Nine of the pictures had phonologi-
cally similar labels (bat, cat, hat, mat, map, rat, tap, cap),
and nine control pictures had phonologically dissimilar labels
(drum, shoe, fork, bell, leaf, bird, lock, fox). All items were
one syllable in length and matched for word frequency as in-
dexed by Kucera and Francis (1967) and Thorndike and
Lorge (1944) counts, and for imageability and concreteness
as reported in theMRC Psycholinguistic Database (Coltheart,
1981). A multivariate analysis of these four measures across
the two stimulus types revealed a nonsignificant main effect of
stimulus type usingWilks’ criterion, F (4, 10)¼ 0.60, p¼ .67,
confirming the adequacy of this matching.
Thirteen of the 18 pictures were drawn from Snodgrass
and Vanderwart’s (1980) standardized set. Five of the pic-
tures (tap, rat, cap, mat, map) were not available from Snod-
grass and Vanderwart’s (1980) set and so were selected from
Microsoft Clipart so as to match as closely as possible the
style of Snodgrass and Vanderwart’s pictures. All stimuli
were presented on a Dell 15-in. flat-screen monitor, using
Microsoft Powerpoint.
Design and procedures. Short-term memory for the materials
of each stimulus type (phonological, control) was assessed
1. One participant in the ASD group scored above the defined cutoff for
ASD on the reciprocal social interaction subscale of the ADOS, but not
on the Total Social Interaction + Communication Scale. We included
this participant because they had received a diagnosis of Asperger syn-
drome from a leading UK assessment team and because they scored 42
on the AQ, well above the cutoff for ASD on this measure.
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using an incremental span procedure. Items were presented in
sequences that varied from two to eight pictures. There were
three trials at each sequence length. Items in each trial appeared
in the center of the screen for 1 s. After presentation of the last
item in each trial, the screen went blank and the participant was
invited to recall the items in serial order. Each trial was consid-
ered to have been successfully completed if all items were re-
called in correct order. If at least one of the three trials at a given
sequence length was successfully completed, the participant
was given another set of (three) trials at a greater sequence
length. When none of the trials at a given sequence length
was successfully completed, the participant moved on to the
next stimulus type. The order in which each stimulus type
was completed was counterbalanced across participants. Trials
involving each stimulus type began with three-item sequences
(i.e., three trials of three items). If none of the trials was suc-
cessfully completed at this sequence length then participants
were given a set of trials with two-item sequences.
Participants completed trials involving each type of stim-
ulus under two conditions: in counterbalanced order, partici-
pants completed each stimulus type once under articulatory
suppression and once under silent conditions. To illustrate,
a participant might complete the phonological trials under si-
lent conditions followed immediately by the control trials un-
der silent conditions. Then, after a short break, they would
complete a different set of phonological trials (containing
the same pictures, but arranged into different sequences) un-
der silent conditions followed immediately by a different set
of control trials (containing the same pictures, but arranged in
different sequences) under articulatory suppression. In the ar-
ticulatory suppression condition, participants repeated either
the word “Tuesday” or the word “Thursday” (counterbal-
anced across participants) in time to a metronome, which
was set to a rate of 65 beats per minute. The metronome re-
mained on during the silent condition, but participants did
not articulate the task-irrelevant word. It is important to
note that throughout both experiments reported in this study,
participants from each group engaged in articulatory suppres-
sion appropriately during the suppression conditions. The ex-
perimenter was vigilant in making sure that participants ar-
ticulated the task-irrelevant word in time to the metronome.
Participants were tested individually in a sound-attenuated
laboratory at the university at which the research was con-
ducted. The experimenter first showed participants each pic-
ture from the task and labeled it. This was done in order to
ensure that the correct labels, which had beenmatched for syl-
lable length, were being used. If, for example, a participant
had consistently used an incorrect/alternative label (e.g.,
“padlock,” for the item “lock”) in a particular condition,
then any findings would be confounded by uncontrolled
“word length effects” (Baddeley, Thompson, & Buchanan,
1975). During the task participants always employed the cor-
rect terms for the pictures, without exception.
Before beginning the task, participants were given three
practice trials (each involving three-item sequences) under
each of the conditions (silent and suppression). Specifically,
participants who completed the task under articulatory sup-
pression first received three practice trials under silent condi-
tions, followed immediately by three practice trials under ar-
ticulatory suppression. They then completed the experimental
trials with a short break between conditions. Participants who
completed the silent condition first of all completed three
practice trials under silent conditions before completing the
experimental trials under silent conditions. Then, after a short
break, they completed three practice trials under articulatory
suppression, before completing the experimental trials under
suppression.
Scoring. Participants’ recall performance was determined
using a “partial credit scoring” method, which is considered
the gold standard way to score memory span (Conway et al.,
2005). According to this method, participants received a score
of one for every trial in which all items were correctly recalled
in serial order, plus a proportional score for each unsuccessful
trial. This proportional score corresponded to the proportion
of items within each trial that were recalled in the correct po-
sition. Hence, if a participant recalled two out of four items
(on a four-item trial), their score for that trial would be 0.50.
Two scores were employed as measures of inner speech
use. First, the size of the phonological similarity effect was
determined by subtracting recall performance on phonologi-
cal trials completed under silent conditions from recall per-
Table 1. Participant characteristics for Experiment 1
Group
ASD (n ¼ 17) Comparison (n ¼ 17) t p d
Age 42.13 (14.14) 39.43 (12.51) 0.59 .56 0.20
VIQ 112.82 (11.84) 117.59 (13.13) 21.11 .28 0.38
PIQ 112.88 (15.33) 112.59 (11.05) 0.06 .95 0.02
FSIQ 114.00 (13.39) 116.71 (13.32) 20.59 .56 0.20
AQ 33.88 (7.05) 12.13 (5.86)a 9.60 ,.001 3.36
ADOS total 10.00 (3.46) — — — —
Note: ASD, autism spectrum disorder; VIQ, verbal IQ; PIQ, performance IQ; FSIQ, full-scale IQ; AQ, Autism Spectrum Quotient;
ADOS, Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule.
aBased on 16/17 comparison participants.
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formance on control trials completed under silent conditions.
The more positive the resulting value, the more one can as-
sume that inner speech was relied upon to complete the
task. Second, the size of the articulatory suppression effect
was determined by subtracting recall performance on control
trials completed under silent conditions from recall perfor-
mance on control trials completed under articulatory suppres-
sion. Again, the more positive the resulting value, the greater
the evidence that inner speech was relied upon to complete
the task.
As argued above, in addition to analyzing group means,
we also believe it is important to explore individual data.
Therefore, we created two categorical variables that corre-
sponded to the PSE and articulatory suppression effect, re-
spectively. Categorically, participants were deemed to have
shown a PSE if they recalled greater than or equal to one trial
more on control trials than on phonological trials. Likewise,
participants were deemed to have shown an articulatory sup-
pression effect if they recalled greater than or equal to one
trial more on control trials in the silent condition than on con-
trol trials in the articulatory suppression condition.
Results
Table 2 shows the mean number of trials correctly recalled by
ASD and comparison participants in each condition (suppres-
sion/silent), by stimulus type (phonological/control). A
mixed analysis of variance was conducted on these data,
with condition and stimulus type as within-participant vari-
ables, and group as the between-participants variable. There
was a significant main effect of condition, F (1, 32) ¼
40.00, p , .001, and a significant main effect of stimulus
type, F (1, 32) ¼ 51.39, p , .001. However, these main ef-
fects were qualified by a significant interaction between con-
dition and stimulus type, F (1, 32) ¼ 24.67, p , .001.
To break down this interaction, a series of within-partici-
pant t tests exploring the recall of trials involving each stimulus
type in each condition was conducted. In the silent condition,
phonologically similar stimuli were recalled significantly less
well than control stimuli, indicating a clear phonological simi-
larity effect, with a large effect size, t (33)¼26.65, p, .001,
d ¼ 21.39. In contrast, in the articulatory suppression condi-
tion, phonologically similar stimuli were recalled nonsignifi-
cantly less well than control stimuli, with only a small effect
size, t (33)¼21.98, p¼ .06, d¼20.19. Hence, as predicted,
a significant phonological similarity effect was apparent in the
silent condition, but not the articulatory suppression condition.
In addition, recall of control stimuli in the articulatory suppres-
sion condition was significantly poorer than recall of control
stimuli in the silent condition, indicating a clear articulatory
suppression effect, with a large effect size, t (33) ¼ 6.36,
p , .001, d ¼ 21.34. In contrast, recall of phonologically
similar stimuli in the suppression condition was only margin-
ally significantly poorer than recall of phonologically similar
stimuli in the silent condition, with a small effect size, t (33)
¼ 2.02, p ¼ .05, d ¼20.25. Hence, as predicted, articulatory
suppression had a substantial negative effect on the recall of
control stimuli, but only a marginal effect on the recall of
phonologically similar stimuli.
There was no significant main effect of group, F (1, 32)¼
0.87, p ¼ .36, and no significant interaction between group
and condition, F (1, 32) ¼ 0.71, p ¼ .41, or between group
and stimulus type, F (1, 32) ¼ 0.58, p ¼ .45. The three-
way interaction between group, condition, and stimulus
type was also nonsignificant, F (1, 32) ¼ 0.04, p ¼ .85.
Therefore, participants with ASD were similar to comparison
participants in terms of both overall levels and patterns of per-
formance (see Figure 1).
Categorically, 15 of 17 (88%) participants with ASD and
16 of 17 (94%) comparison participants showed a PSE. In
this respect, the groups were not different, x2 ¼ 0.37, Fisher
exact p . .99, w ¼ 0.10. Similarly, 13 of 17 (76%) partici-
pants with ASD and 14 of 17 (82%) comparison participants
showed an articulatory suppression effect, x2 ¼ 0.18, Fisher
exact p . .99, w ¼ 0.07.
Figure 1. The serial recall performance on each type of trial (phonological,
control) in each condition (silent/suppression) among autism spectrum disorder
and comparison participants in Experiment 1. Errors bars represent 1 SEM.
Table 2. Mean (SD) number of phonological and control
trials recalled by autism spectrum disorder (ASD)
and comparison participants in each condition of
Experiment 1
Group
Condition
Stimulus
Type
ASD
(n ¼ 17)
Comparison
(n ¼ 17)
Silent Phonological 9.35 (2.31) 10.06 (3.10)
Control 13.69 (3.46) 13.79 (2.78)
Articulatory
suppression Phonological 8.46 (2.34) 9.68 (2.54)
Control 9.17 (3.06) 10.04 (3.13)
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Associations between inner speech use and ASD features. A
series of correlation analyses was conducted to explore the
relation between the key experimental measures of verbal
mediation (size of PSE and size of articulatory suppression
effect), as well as the relations between each of these mea-
sures, respectively, and ASD features (as measured by the
ADOS and AQ). First, when analyzing the continuous data,
the size of the PSE was significantly associated with the
size of the articulatory suppression effect among both ASD
participants (rs ¼ .88, p, .001) and comparison participants
(rs ¼ .74, p ¼ .001). When analyzing the categorical data,
there was a significant association between displaying a
PSE and displaying an articulatory suppression effect among
participants from both diagnostic groups (x2 ¼ 4.27, Fisher
exact p ¼ .04, w ¼ 0.36).
The ADOS has a total score, which is a combination of
scores from two core diagnostic subscales, the reciprocal so-
cial interaction subscale and the communication subscale. To
adjust for multiple comparisons in analyses involving the
ADOS, a Bonferroni corrected alpha level of ,.017 was ap-
plied. Among participants with ASD, neither the size of the
PSE nor the size of the articulatory suppression effect was
significantly associated with the ADOS Total score, or either
of the core ADOS subscale scores (all rss, .29, all ps. .27).
The AQ has a total score, which is derived from scores on
five subscales: social skill, attention switching, attention to
detail, communication, imagination. To adjust for multiple
comparisons in analyses involving the AQ, a Bonferroni cor-
rected alpha level of ,.008 was applied. The size of the
PSE was not significantly associated with the AQ total score,
or any of the five subscale scores among participants with
ASD (all rss , .40, all ps . .11), or among comparison par-
ticipants (all rss, .32, all ps. .23). Similarly, the size of the
articulatory suppression effect was not significantly associated
with the AQ Total score, or any of the five AQ subscale scores
among participants with ASD (all rss , .55, all ps . .02), or
among comparison participants (all rss , .45, all ps . .08).
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 were clear. Participants from
each group showed a substantial PSE in serial recall, indicat-
ing that (visually presented) stimuli were spontaneously re-
coded, and then presumably rehearsed, prior to recall. This re-
sult replicates that of Williams et al. (2008) and arguably
confirms their suggestion that individuals with ASD are typ-
ical in employing inner speech as a means of retaining infor-
mation in short-term memory. Nonetheless, as highlighted
above, it could have been that the PSE was insensitive to di-
minished inner speech use in ASD and that Williams et al.’s
(2008) failure to find differences between their groups of par-
ticipants was merely an artefact of this insensitivity (Wallace
at al., 2009). However, in the current study, recall perfor-
mance among both participants with ASD and comparison
participants was also substantially negatively affected by
articulatory suppression. Among each group of participants,
the degree to which phonological similarity of items nega-
tively affected recall performance was highly correlated
with the degree to which articulatory suppression negatively
affected performance. This suggests that both measures
were assessing a common underlying process in each group
of participants, namely, the degree to which inner speech
was relied upon to mediate the experimental task.
In addition, at the individual level almost 90% of partici-
pants with ASD showed a PSE and almost 80% showed an ar-
ticulatory suppression effect. Together, these results provide
convincing evidence that short-termmemory for nameable vi-
sually presented information is verbally mediated among the
majority of people with ASD who have a verbal mental age
of 7 years or above (cf. Williams et al., 2008). What remains
unclear, however, is whether people with ASD rely less than
people without ASD on inner speech use for purposes other
than retaining information in short-term memory. Experiment
2 explored whether the same participants with ASD also
employ inner speech for the purpose of planning.
Experiment 2
Participants
Fifteen participants with ASD and 16 comparison partici-
pants took part in Experiment 2. These participants also
took part in Experiment 1. Two participants from the ASD
group and one comparison participant elected not to take
part in Experiment 2. The groups were matched for age, ver-
bal IQ, performance IQ, and full-scale IQ; all ts , 1.25, all
ps. .22, all ds, 0.45. Themean AQ score of the ASD group
(M¼ 34.53, SD¼ 7.24) was significantly higher than that of
the comparison group (M ¼ 12.13, SD¼ 5.86, t ¼ 9.50, p,
.001, d ¼ 3.40).
Apparatus and stimuli
Participants completed 18 computerized tower of London
puzzles, each involving three pegs, and five colored disks
of different sizes (see Figure 2). Each puzzle was presented
Figure 2.An example of the materials from Experiment 2. The trial displayed
takes a minimum of nine moves to solve (actual disk colors were red, green,
yellow, blue, and white).
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on a 14-in. Dell laptop screen. The goal state was visible
throughout each trial at the top of the screen. Directly under-
neath the goal state was the puzzle for participants to com-
plete, which always began in the appropriate starting state.
The puzzles were selected from those of Ward and Allport
(1997, p. 77, appendix B). Puzzles were divided into two sets,
each consisting of nine puzzles. Across sets, the puzzles were
equated for difficulty in terms of the minimum number of
moves required to solve each (i.e., reach the goal state from
the start state). In each set, two problems required a minimum
of five moves to reach a solution, two required a minimum of
seven moves, two required a minimum of nine moves, and
one puzzle in each set required a minimum of 10, 11, and
13 moves, respectively.
Ward and Allport (1997) identified two further factors that
influence the relative difficulty of tower of London problems;
the number of “subgoal moves” required and the number of
“subgoal chunks” required. A subgoal move is defined by
Ward and Allport (1997) as “a move that is essential to the op-
timum solution, but which does not place a disk into its goal
position” (p. 56). A subgoal chunk is defined as “a consecutive
series of subgoal moves that transfer disks to and from the same
pegs” (p. 57). Ward and Allport (1997) found that, among typ-
ical adults, as each of these factors increased so did the number
of errors (i.e., nonoptimal moves), indicating an increasing load
on planning resources. As such, in the current study, puzzles in
each set were also matched for number of subgoals (ranging
from zero to five, per puzzle) and the number of subgoal
chunks (ranging from zero to four per puzzle).
Design and procedures
Participants completed one set of puzzles under silent condi-
tions and the other set of puzzles under concurrent articula-
tory suppression. The order in which the conditions (suppres-
sion and silent) were completed, as well as the order in which
sets of puzzles were presented, was counterbalanced across
participants. In the articulatory suppression condition, partic-
ipants repeated either the word “Tuesday” or the word
“Thursday” (counterbalanced across participants) in time to
a metronome, which was set to a rate of 65 beats per minute.
Before beginning the experimental trials, participants were
given three practice trials (involving two, three, and four
move sequences, respectively) under each of the conditions
(silent and suppression). In the samemanner as in Experiment
1, those participants who first undertook the articulatory sup-
pression condition completed three practice trials in silence,
followed by three practice trials under suppression, before be-
ginning the experimental trials. Participants who first under-
took the silent condition completed three practice trials in si-
lence, before completing the experimental trials under silent
conditions. Then, after a short break, they completed three
practice trials under articulatory suppression, before complet-
ing the experimental trials under suppression.
Participants were introduced to the task by the experi-
menter, who explained that the aim was to “make the puzzle
at the bottom of the screen (start state) look exactly like
the puzzle at the top of the screen (goal state).” On a single
trial, the experimenter demonstrated how the disks could be
moved from peg to peg, and explained how any disk could
go on top of any other disk. All participants understood the
nature of the task. The experimenter explained, further, that
the “aim was to complete the puzzle in as few moves as
possible. So, you’ll need to plan how to move the disks before
you start.”
Scoring
An articulatory suppression effect index was created by sub-
tracting the total number of moves taken to complete the puz-
zles in the silent condition from the total number of moves
taken to complete the puzzles in the articulatory suppression
condition. The more positive the resulting value, the more it
was assumed that inner speech was relied upon to complete
the task. Categorically, participants were deemed to have
shown an articulatory suppression effect if they if they took
greater than or equal to one more move to complete puzzles
in the articulatory suppression condition than in the silent
condition.
Results
Participants with ASD took an average of 84.87 (SD ¼ 5.04)
moves to complete all nine Tower puzzles in the silent condi-
tion and an average of 84.47 (SD ¼ 5.79) moves to complete
all nine in the articulatory suppression condition. Comparison
participants took an average of 83.44 (SD ¼ 5.93) moves to
complete the puzzles in the silent condition and an average
of 89.25 (SD ¼ 6.52) moves to complete the puzzles in the
articulatory suppression condition. A mixed analysis of var-
iance was conducted on these data, with condition (suppres-
sion/silent) as the within-participant variable and group as the
between-participants variable. The main effect of group was
nonsignificant, F (1, 29)¼ 1.03, p¼ .32. There was a signif-
icant main effect of condition, F (1, 29) ¼ 4.32, p ¼ .05.
However, this was qualified by a significant interaction be-
tween condition and group, F (1, 29) ¼ 5.69, p ¼ .02. To
break down this interaction, within- and between-participant
t tests were conducted exploring performance in each condi-
tion. Whereas participants with ASD performed comparably
in each condition (i.e., were not negatively affected by articu-
latory suppression), t (14)¼ 0.20, p¼ .85, d¼ 0.07, compar-
ison participants performed significantly less well in the ar-
ticulatory suppression condition than in the silent condition,
t (15) ¼ 3.46, p ¼ .003, d ¼ 20.93. Whereas participants
with ASD performed nonsignificantly less well than compar-
ison participants in the silent condition, t (29) ¼ 0.72, p ¼
.48, d ¼ 20.26, they performed significantly better than
comparison participants in the articulatory suppression con-
dition, t (29) ¼ 2.15, p ¼ .04, d ¼ 0.78.
Categorically, 6 of 15 (40%) participants with ASD and 14
of 16 (88%) comparison participants showed an articulatory
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suppression effect. In this respect, the groups were signifi-
cantly different (x2 ¼ 7.63, p ¼ .006, w ¼ 0.50).2
Associations between inner speech use and ASD features
A series of correlation analyses was conducted to explore
the relations between the key experimental measure of ver-
bal mediation (size of articulatory suppression effect) and
ASD features. As in Experiment 1, a Bonferroni corrected
alpha level of ,.017 was applied in analyses involving
the ADOS. Among participants with ASD, the size of the
articulatory suppression effect was not significantly associ-
ated with the ADOS total score (rs ¼ 2.41, p ¼ .13) or
with the ADOS reciprocal social interaction subscale score
(rs ¼ 2.07, p ¼ .81). However, the size of the articulatory
suppression effect was strongly and significantly associated
with the ADOS communication subscale score (rs ¼ 2.72,
p ¼ .003).
As in Experiment 1, a Bonferroni corrected alpha level of
,.008 was applied in analyses involving the AQ. Among
participants with ASD, the size of the articulatory suppres-
sion effect was significantly associated with AQ communi-
cation subscale score (rs ¼ 2.76, p ¼ .001) only (all other
rss , 2.56, all other ps . .03).3 It is important to note that
the correlations between the size of articulatory suppression
effect, and ADOS communication score and AQ communica-
tion score, respectively, were not merely a byproduct of ver-
bal intelligence, given that verbal IQwas not positively or sig-
nificantly associated with any of these variables (all rs ,
2.31, all ps . .23).
Next, through a series of linear regression analyses, we as-
sessed the extent to which variance in the articulatory sup-
pression effect was explained by a common factor underlying
both the ADOS communication subscale score and the AQ
communication subscale score. Together, the two scores ex-
plained 69.3% of the variance in the size of the articulatory
suppression effect. The ADOS communication subscale
score uniquely accounted for 12.6% of the variance and the
AQ communication subscale score uniquely accounted for
27.3% of the variance. Thus, 29.4% of the variance in the
size of the suppression effect was explained by an underlying
factor shared by the two subscale scores. In other words, a
fundamental aspect of communication ability, assessed by
both measures, was driving the significant correlations be-
tween the size of the suppression effect and each of the sub-
scale scores, respectively.
Post hoc analysis of successful planning among
individuals with ASD
The finding that participants with ASD did not perform sig-
nificantly less well than comparison participants in the silent
condition of the tower task was not unexpected, given that
several studies of planning abilities in ASD have reported
null results when using computerized versions of this plan-
ning task (Goldberg et al., 2005; Happe´, Booth, Charlton,
& Hughes, 2006; Just, Cherkassky, Keller, Kana, & Min-
shew, 2007; Ozonoff et al. 2004). However, what needs to
be explained is how individuals with ASD are performing
well on the task in the current study, given that they were
not apparently employing inner speech to mediate their plan-
ning. According to Motton and colleagues (e.g., Caron, Mot-
tron, Bethiaume, &Motton, 2006), among others (e.g., Plais-
ted, O’Riordan, & Baron-Cohen, 1998), visuospatial abilities
tend to be enhanced among individuals with ASD and em-
ployed to solve tasks that might be solved by other means
among typically developing individuals. In a recent review,
Mottron, Dawson, Soulie`res, Hubert, and Burack (2006,
p. 39) concluded that,
. . . perception plays a different and superior role in autistic cogni-
tion. Recent studies in the visual and auditory modalities indicate
a skewing of brain activation toward primary and early associative
areas in autistics in most tasks involving higher-order or socially rel-
evant information . . .
Of the 12 subtests that comprise the WAIS, the block design
subtest is considered to be a unique measure of visuospatial
abilities (e.g., Caron et al., 2006). Therefore, in order to ex-
amine whether visuospatial abilities were uniquely associated
2. The exact same pattern of results was observed if other criteria were em-
ployed for determining categorically whether an articulatory suppression
effect was displayed by participants. For example, if an articulatory sup-
pression effect was defined as taking equal to or more than five moves
to complete the Tower puzzles in the articulatory suppression condition
than in the silent condition (which is equivalent to a drop in performance
across conditions of ~1 SD), 75% of comparison participants displayed
the effect, compared to only 26.7% of participants with ASD (x2 ¼
7.24, p ¼ .007, w ¼ 0.48).
3. The subscales of the AQ were determined a priori by Baron-Cohen et al.
(2001). Three subsequent studies have explored the structure of the AQ
using factor analysis. Two studies converge upon a three factor structure
(Social Skills, Communication/Mindreading, Details/Patterns; Austin,
2005; Hurst, Mitchell, Kimbrel, Kwapil, & Nelson-Gray; 2007) and one
study suggests a four factor structure (Social Skills, Communication/Un-
derstanding Others, Patterns, Imagination; Stewart & Austin, 2009). No-
tably, all studies contain a social skills subscale, as well as a communica-
tion subscale. Correlation analyses were rerun using the scores from the
AQ subscales suggested by each of the factor analytic studies. Results
were identical to the original analyses, with communication skills being
related uniquely to inner speech use among participants with ASD. The
size of the articulatory suppression effect was associated significantly
both with the “Communication/understanding others” subscale suggested
by Stewart and Austin (2003; rs ¼2.74, p¼ .002) and with the commu-
nication/mindreading subscale suggested by Austin (2005) and Hurst
et al. (2007; rs ¼2.73, p ¼ .002). No other correlations were significant
(all other rss,2.47, all ps. .07). Across all three factor analytic studies,
six questions from the AQ consistently loaded significantly onto a Com-
munication factor. We ran an additional correlation analysis, exploring the
association between the size of the articulatory suppression effect and the
communication score derived from only these six questions. Remarkably,
this association was also highly significant (rs ¼2.73, p¼ .002). Across
all four studies of the AQ, including the original study by Baron-Cohen
et al. (2001), three questions from the AQ consistently loaded signifi-
cantly onto a Communication factor. The association between the size
of the articulatory suppression effect and the score derived from only these
three questions was highly significant (rs ¼ 2.85, p , .001).
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with (and arguably underlie) planning performance among
participants with ASD, we conducted correlation analyses ex-
ploring the relation between performance on the block design
subtest of the WAIS and performance in the silent condition
of the Tower task. It is important to stress that, although these
analyses were post hoc, they were the only analyses we con-
ducted and they were based on the specific hypothesis that
planning performance in ASD is uniquely underpinned by
perceptual abilities, whereas it is uniquely underpinned by in-
ner speech use among comparison participants. In line with
this hypothesis, performance on the block design subtest
was highly and significantly associated with planning perfor-
mance among individuals with ASD (rs ¼ .64, p ¼ .01). In
contrast, the association was minimal among comparison par-
ticipants (rs ¼ .03, p ¼ .92).
Association between inner speech use in Experiment 1 and
inner speech use in Experiment 2
To explore whether the use of inner speech to mediate short-
term memory was associated with the use of inner speech to
mediate planning, analyses were conducted to assess the rela-
tion between the PSE and the articulatory suppression effect,
respectively, from Experiment 1 with the articulatory sup-
pression effect from Experiment 2. Analysis of the continu-
ous data revealed that among neither group of participants
was there a significant association between the size of the
PSE in Experiment 1 and the size of the articulatory suppres-
sion effect in Experiment 2, or between the size of the articu-
latory suppression effect in Experiment 1 and the size of the
articulatory suppression effect in Experiment 2 (all rs ,
2.23, all ps . .41).
Analysis of the categorical data revealed an important dif-
ference between the diagnostic groups in patterns of perfor-
mance across experiments. Among comparison participants,
13 of 16 (81%) showed a categorical PSE in Experiment 1
and a categorical articulatory suppression effect in Experi-
ment 2. Likewise, 12 of 16 (75%) of comparison participants
showed a categorical articulatory suppression effect in Ex-
periment 1 and a categorical articulatory suppression effect
in Experiment 2. However, among participants with ASD,
the pattern of performance across experiments was quite dif-
ferent. Only 5 of 15 (33%) participants with ASD showed a
categorical PSE in Experiment 1 and a categorical articula-
tory suppression effect in Experiment 2. In contrast, 8 of 15
(53%) participants with ASD showed a categorical PSE in
Experiment 1, but not a categorical articulatory suppression
effect in Experiment 2. This compared to only 1 of 15
(0.07%) of participants with ASD who showed the opposite
pattern of performance. Therefore, participants with ASD
were significantly more likely to use inner speech to mediate
their short-term memory, but not their planning than vice
versa (McNemar p ¼ .04). A similar result was observed
when comparing the effects of articulatory suppression across
experiments. Only 4 of 15 (28%) of participants with ASD
showed a categorical articulatory suppression effect in Ex-
periment 1 and a categorical articulatory suppression effect
in Experiment 2. Instead, 7 of 15 (47%) showed a categorical
articulatory suppression effect in Experiment 1, but not a cat-
egorical articulatory suppression effect in Experiment 2. This
compared to only 2 of 15 (13%) participants who showed the
opposite pattern (McNemar one tailed p ¼ .09).
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 were clear; preventing inner
speech use by imposing articulatory suppression had a signif-
icant detrimental effect on the planning performance of com-
parison participants (d ¼ 20.93). In contrast, preventing in-
ner speech use among participants with ASD had next to
no effect on their planning performance (d¼ 0.07). At the in-
dividual level, only just over one-third of participants with
ASD were at all negatively affected by the imposition of ar-
ticulatory suppression, whereas almost 90% of comparison
participants were so affected. These results suggest that indi-
viduals with ASD rely significantly less than comparison par-
ticipants on inner speech to mediate their planning. Post hoc
analyses provided some evidence that, instead of using inner
speech to mediate their planning, individuals with ASD relied
on their visuospatial skills to mediate the Tower task.
Perhaps most strikingly, the degree to which articulatory
suppression negatively affected tower of London perfor-
mance among ASD participants was highly and significantly
correlated with the severity of communication difficulties ex-
perienced by these individuals. In other words, as the severity
of communication difficulties increased (as established either
by detailed observation, using the ADOS, or self-report,
using the AQ), inner speech use for planning decreased.
General Discussion
The idea that language/speech plays a significant role in
thinking is increasingly (although not universally) accepted
by cognitive scientists and psychologists (e.g., Carruthers,
2002). Moreover, according to Vygotsky (1987), verbal think-
ing has its origins in interpersonal communication with others
early in life. Together, these two ideas have understandably
led to the idea that a failure of verbal thinking may be impli-
cated in ASD, arguably the prototypical disorder of social
communication, which also involves diminished higher order
cognition (e.g., Fernyhough, 1996). Empirical research on
verbal thinking in ASD had produced mixed results and we
raised concerns about the methodological approaches taken
in those studies that claimed to have observed diminished
verbal mediation in ASD. The results of the current study argu-
ably provide a clearer picture not only of the nature of verbal
thinking among people with ASD, but also of the way verbal
thinking typically develops.
In a broad sense, the results of this study support the idea
outlined above that individuals with ASD are atypical in the
sense that they employ inner speech for the purpose of recod-
ing visually presented information into a verbal code in order
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to retain it in short-term memory, but do not employ inner
speech to assist their planning. The findings that participants
with ASD showed a clear PSE in their serial recall of visually
presented material, and that articulatory suppression severely
disrupted their recall performance, provides strong support
for the idea that verbal recoding of visual information is com-
mon among the majority of people with this disorder (cf. Wil-
liams et al., 2008; Williams & Jarrold, 2010). It is arguable,
however, that the current study is the first to demonstrate con-
vincingly that an aspect of executive functioning, namely,
planning, is not verbally mediated among the majority of peo-
plewith ASD. In the current study, planning performancewas
not detrimentally affected by articulatory suppression among
the majority of participants with ASD, unlike among compar-
ison participants, the majority of whom were severely nega-
tively affected. Instead, the planning performance of partici-
pants with ASD was uniquely associated with visuospatial
processing abilities, as measured by the block design subtest
of the WAIS. Although caution is certainly warranted when
interpreting this latter result (given that the analysis that re-
vealed this finding was conducted post hoc, as well as given
difficulties with inferring causation from correlation), this
provides some evidence in support of Mottron et al.’s
(2006, p. 39) claim that “perception plays a different and su-
perior role in autistic cognition.” Specifically, this result sug-
gests that individuals with ASD rely on visuospatial abilities,
rather than inner speech, to mediate their planning.
One striking implication of the current findings is that the
mechanism underpinning inner speech use is intact among
people with ASD, but fundamentally different forms of inner
speech are involved in mediating different cognitive domains;
in addition, it is critical that only one of these forms is dimin-
ished among individuals with ASD. Following Fernyhough
(1996, 2008), Williams et al. (2008, p. 57) distinguished be-
tween inner speech that is “dialogic” and inner speech that is
“monologic,” and questioned whether individuals with ASD
showed a diminution of the former kind only. As Fernyhough
(2008, p. 233) highlights, “the verbal thinking upon which we
can sometimes introspect often appears to us as a kind of dia-
logue between distinct perspectives on reality.” Therefore,
dialogic inner speech involves a kind of “conversation” be-
tween different aspects of self/perspectives held by self and
is an ideal medium for accommodating multiple, alternative
perspectives upon a topic of thought. It is this ability to
hold in mind and move flexibly between different perspec-
tives on a situation that arguably facilitates efficient problem
solving in situations where one might otherwise become
“stuck in set.” This form of inner speech could clearly max-
imize planning efficiency on the tower of London task by al-
lowing one to mentally consider alternative ways of moving
from the start state to the goal state, and then act according
to the best mental model. However, we suggest (following
Fernyhough’s reading of Vygotsky) that this form of inner
speech use may have inherently social origins and that with-
out adequate experiences of communicating with others this
kind of inner speech will not develop typically. The message
from Vygotskian theory is clear: individuals who are poor at
conversing with others will be poor at conversing with self.
This would explain both why the majority of participants
with ASD were unaffected by the imposition of articulatory
suppression during the tower of London task in Experiment 2,
and also why the extent to which they were affected by sup-
pression was associated closely with the severity of their com-
munication impairments.
In contrast to dialogic inner speech, monologic inner
speech involves merely a commentary by self about a partic-
ular state of affairs. This form of inner speech might be de-
scribed as “for oneself,” unlike dialogic inner speech that is
“to oneself.” The development of this kind of inner speech is
far from trivial and it could have considerable benefits for cog-
nition. For example, rehearsing novel verbal information may
facilitate the acquisition of long-term knowledge by prevent-
ing its loss from short-term memory. However, this kind of
verbal labeling and subvocal rehearsal is clearly not “conver-
sational” in the same way that dialogic inner speech is. Argu-
ably, therefore, the ability to engage in this kind of inner
speech does not depend on experience of social-communica-
tive exchanges with others. This would explain why the serial
recall performance of participants with ASD was negatively
affected by articulatory suppression and phonological similar-
ity in Experiment 1, and also why the size of these effects was
not significantly associated with communication skills among
these participants. Moreover, the idea that only dialogic inner
speech is diminished in ASDwould make sense of the finding
that participants with ASD in the current study used inner
speech inconsistently across experiments. For example, partic-
ipants with ASD were significantly more likely to employ in-
ner speech in Experiment 1 only than they were to employ in-
ner speech in Experiment 2 only. In contrast, the vast majority
of comparison participants employed inner speech across both
experiments. One interpretation of this is that participants with
ASD are restricted to employing monologic inner speech,
whereas comparison participants can engage in both mono-
logic and dialogic forms of inner speech.
The current findings have other important implications for
our understanding of the typical development and use of ver-
bal mediation. First, the evidence from ASD does not support
the Vygotskian hypothesis that the shift from visual to verbal
mediation is domain general. Rather, the evidence from ASD
suggests that it is possible for inner speech to be used quite
typically to mediate some domains of cognition, but not other
domains. This suggests that the apparent domain-generality
of inner speech use among typically developing individuals
(e.g., Al-Namlah et al., 2006) may only be superficial. Sec-
ond, these results suggest that there is a critical distinction be-
tween possessing good structural language and using this for
the purpose of structuring cognition. In the current study, par-
ticipants with ASD were verbally able, but did not use inner
speech to support their planning. Conversely, there is recent
evidence that children with specific language impairment,
who by definition have impaired structural language but com-
paratively unimpaired communication skills, do employ inner
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speech to mediate their planning (Lidstone, Fernyhough, &
Meins, 2010).
The implications of the current study (outlined directly
above) could be assessed in a number of ways. Future studies
should explore directly the quality of inner speech used by
individuals with and without ASD to mediate different as-
pects of cognition. This might be done, in the first instance,
via self-report (although self-reported use of inner speech
by individuals with ASD may not wholly accurate; Williams
et al., 2008). We predict that only dialogic forms of inner
speech will be associated with communication skills. Related
to this, inner speech use could be further explored among par-
ticipants with language impairments, contrasting those partic-
ipants in whom language impairment is primarily structural
(as in specific language impairment) with those participants
in whom impairment is primarily pragmatic (as in pragmatic
language impairment; Bishop, 1989). We predict that only
among children with pragmatic language impairment will
verbal mediation be diminished. Specifically, children with
pragmatic language impairment should resemble individuals
with ASD in showing diminished dialogic inner speech only.
Finally, the current results may be used to inform teaching
and intervention strategies for children with ASD. First, the
finding that inner speech (even if only monologic inner
speech) can be employed by individuals with ASD to mediate
short-term memory has implications for teaching strategies.
For example, as Eley (2008) highlights, many UK-based spe-
cialist schools for children with ASD use visual time tables to
support children with ASD. However, given that verbal re-
hearsal provides a more efficient means of scaffolding
short-term memory (and, hence, long-term learning) than
does visual imagery, and because individuals with ASD
(who have a verbal mental age over 7 years) are capable of
verbal rehearsal, it may be more productive to encourage ver-
bal learning of timetables among these children. Second, the
fact that the mechanism underlying at least some aspects of
inner speech is intact among individuals with ASD leads us
to wonder whether dialogic forms of inner speech might be
encouraged as part of intervention efforts. Among young typ-
ically developing children, efforts to encourage monologic
forms of inner speech have been somewhat successful, signif-
icantly improving children’s performance on a variety of cog-
nitive tasks (e.g., Asarnow & Meichenbaum, 1979; Kray
et al., 2008). However, there is some (arguably justified)
scepticism that efforts to train dialogic forms of inner speech
have any meaningful long-term benefits for cognition among
typically developing children (see Diaz &Berk, 1995). None-
theless, no such training efforts have been targeted at children
with ASD and we believe that there may be some value to
conducting studies to explore this issue further.
What is clear from the current results is that there is not a
blanket failure to employ verbal mediation among people
with ASD. In certain domains of cognition, at least, there is
not even a tendency for individuals with ASD to employ vi-
sual rather than verbal mediation, as some have suggested
(Kunda & Goel, 2011). The short-term memory task em-
ployed in the current study ( just as in the study by Williams
et al., 2008) was equally amenable to visual and verbal solu-
tions, yet participants with ASD consistently mediated the
task verbally. We suggest that the likelihood of individuals
with ASD employing inner speech to mediate a given cog-
nitive task depends on the kind of verbal mediation that will
support performance. Only in those circumstances in which
truly dialogic inner speech is important for task success would
we predict differences between individuals with and without
ASD in underlying meditational strategies. Equally, we sug-
gest that to explain these hypothesize d differences in strategy
among people with ASD will require a truly developmental
perspective that explains not only the nature of differences
but also the ontogenetic origins of these differences.
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